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 Criminal convictions for less serious crimes such as damaging 
property or fleeing from the police may result in a prison sentence or 
probation.1 Commonly, individuals in such cases will agree to forgo a 
criminal trial and enter into a plea bargain,2 in which they may admit 
guilt in an effort to secure a more favorable sentence of probation 
rather than prison time. Although plea bargains are presumed 
constitutional, not every condition of probation is permissible.3 In 
assessing the validity of the conditions of probation, courts have taken 
two different approaches: (1) constitutional analysis approach;4 and (2) 
                                                 
 
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. Meira Greenberg would like to thank her mom and sister for their 
unconditional love and support. She dedicates this Comment to them, as well as in 
loving memory of her dad Yaakov Avramson.  
1 See generally Federal Sentencing Guidelines, November 1, 2006; Alabama v. 
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). 
2 The Lectric Law Library, available at http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p053.htm 
(last visited on November 29, 2006). 
3 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435-37 (1984). 
4 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
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the consent/contract approach.5 Courts that have used the first 
approach engage in a determination of whether the condition agreed to 
is constitutional6 whereas courts that have used the second approach 
engage in a determination of whether the condition was accepted 
voluntarily.7 This Comment contends that the constitutional approach 
is better and argues that the consent/contract approach improperly 
hooks the crook when it upholds constitutionally questionable 
probationary conditions upon the basis that a convict voluntarily 
consents to the condition to avoid a prison sentence.  
 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, in United States v. Barnett, upheld an agreed order that 
required the accused to consent to suspicionless searches during the 
probation period.8 Judge Posner,9 writing for the unanimous three 
judge panel, reasoned that probationers may be subject to 
suspicionless searches because they voluntarily consent to waive their 
Fourth Amendment rights in favor of the less appealing choice of 
facing a prison sentence, which is similar to many waivers made by 
recipients of plea bargain agreements.10  
The Barnett decision is important because it lends credence to the 
consent approach, a little used argument asserted to support the 
suspicionless search of a probationer.11 Under the consent theory, an 
individual waives their right to Fourth Amendment protection and 
procedure, and thus the requirement that searches be reasonable is 
deemed moot.12 Thus, Barnett supports a loophole by which the state 
                                                 
5 United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005). 
6 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.  
7 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
8 Id.  
9 Judge Richard Posner is an expert in the economics of law. He has published 
many works on this topic. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ 
10 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
11 Prior to Barnett, practitioners had attempted to use the consent theory, but 
the Supreme Court specifically declined to review this line of reasoning because the 
search was permissible under the standard Constitutional analysis approach. United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001). 
12Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
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may conduct searches that are not permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment so long as the probationer consents to such searches as a 
prerequisite of probation in lieu of a prison sentence.13   
This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Barnett did not sufficiently examine the propriety of upholding a 
suspicionless search within the terms of a plea bargain agreement upon 
the consent approach because such requirements are unreasonable 
under constitutional analysis. Thus, a suspicionless search as a 
probationary term constitutes an unconstitutional condition absent 
more direction from the Supreme Court that either a suspicionless 
search is permissible under the Fourth Amendment or that the consent 
approach justifies complete removal of a probationer’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  
Part I of this Comment lays out the landscape of a probationer’s 
Fourth Amendment protection by briefly discussing the case law 
leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Barnett. Part II recounts 
the Barnett litigation by setting forth the procedural and factual record 
and then detailing the opinion issued by the court. Part III analyzes the 
consent theory by comparing the typical consent case in which the 
individual is not in custody to the consent given by an individual as a 
prerequisite of probation. Part IV examines the contours of a plea 
bargain agreement, reviews the sentencing guidelines for probation 
and then compares a plea bargain agreement to an agreed order that a 
probationer signs as a prerequisite of release. Part V explores the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and contends that a 
probationary suspicionless search condition constitutes an 
impermissible condition on constitutional rights. Part VI reviews the 
recent Supreme Court decision of Samson v. California and contends 
that this decision cautions against permitting suspicionless searches of 
probationers. Part VII questions the Seventh Circuit’s assertion that 
even if a suspicionless search was an impermissible condition of 
probation, the remedy would be rescission and require Barnett to go to 
prison.   
 
                                                 
13 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS A PROBATIONER 
 
Probationers are subject to less Fourth Amendment Protection 
than a free citizen.14 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” by police officers and 
other government officials.15 Normally, this constitutional right is 
protected by the probable cause and warrant requirement.16 However, 
the Supreme Court decisions of Griffin v. Wisconsin and United States 
v. Knights lowered the requisite probable cause standard to the 
standard of reasonable suspicion for probationers.17 The Court 
justified this lowered standard on one of two bases: either that the 
search constitutes a special need of the state18 or that in light of the 
government’s need and the probationer’s lowered expectation of 
privacy, the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.19  
 
A. Griffin v. Wisconsin 
 
In 1984, nearly 2,000,000 adults were on probation or parole in 
the United States.20 The primary purpose of probation and parole is to 
place the offender back into the community; however, the offender’s 
release into the community is not without restriction.21 In virtually 
                                                 
14 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
16 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The warrant and probable 
cause requirements protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and 
significantly limit police action.  
17 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987). 
18 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872.  
19 Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. 
20 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987 at 173. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 3561. Probation may be used as an alternative to incarceration, 
provided that the terms and conditions of probation can be fashioned so as to fully 
meet the statutory purposes of sentencing, including promoting respect for law, 
4
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every case, conditions accompany the release of the probationer.22 One 
frequently imposed condition of probation requires the probationer to 
submit to searches.23 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court 
articulated the scope of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights, and 
held that those rights did not prohibit a probationer from being 
required to consent to searches as a prerequisite of probation.24  
The petitioner in Griffin challenged the condition of his 
probationary terms which permitted the state to conduct a warrantless 
search of his home.25 In that case, the officers conducted a warrantless 
search after receiving notice from a known informant that the 
probationer may be in possession of weapons.26 The officers did not 
obtain a warrant before conducting the search, but rather relied upon 
the probationer’s consent to submit to such searches.27  
The Griffin Court held that a search of a probationer predicated 
upon reasonable suspicion was justified under the special needs 
doctrine.28 Reasonable suspicion is a standard determined by weighing 
all of the facts including the reliability of the informant and the 
probationer’s history to assess whether there is sufficient evidence to 
believe that the probationer violated the terms of his probation.29 
Although a probationer’s home is subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection, the special needs doctrine permits, under limited 
circumstances, reductions of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and 
protecting the public from further crimes by the offender. 
22 Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980). Common 
conditions of probation include obeying all laws, refraining from alcohol use, 
avoiding association with other convicts, reporting to a probation agent on a regular 
schedule, and advising probation agent of any change in address or employment. 
23 See, e.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982). 
24 483 U.S. at 873. 
25 Id. at 870. 
26 Id. at 872.  
27 Id. at 870. 
28 Id. at 875. The reasonable suspicion standard is a lower standard than the 
probable cause standard.  
29 Id. at 871. 
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protection because a “special needs beyond that of law enforcement 
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable” and 
make the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.30  
The Court reasoned that the state’s operation of a probation 
system operates as a special need beyond law enforcement interests, in 
part because evidence discovered in such a search is rarely used in 
criminal trial, but rather is only admissible at probation revocation 
hearings.31 It found that the purposes of probation, to promote 
rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism, justify a probation officer 
supervising the probationer to ensure that these goals are met, but 
cautioned that the degree of supervision is not unlimited.32 Thus, 
where an officer has reasonable suspicion that the probationer is 
engaged in criminal activity the officer may conduct a search of the 
probationer as part of a legitimate probationary condition.33  
 
B. United States v. Knights 
 
After Griffin, the lower courts split on whether the probationary 
search condition would permit officers to use incriminating evidence 
discovered in the search not only at the probation revocation hearing, 
but also in subsequent criminal trials.34 In Knights, the petitioner 
challenged a probationary condition that permitted officers to conduct 
warrantless searches with or without reasonable cause after evidence 
of Knights’ participation in arson was discovered during a search 
pursuant to this condition.35 The Knights Supreme Court held that the 
                                                 
30 Id. at 873. 
31 Id. at 873-874; see also Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 
(1998). This case talks about how the normal Fourth Amendment protection 
provided by the exclusionary rule, which bars the admission of evidence in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, does not apply in a parole revocation hearing because the 
parole revocation process is not inherently adversarial and thus does not demand 
safeguards of this nature.  
32 483 U.S. at 874-75. 
33 Id. at 879. 
34 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001). 
35 Id. at 114.  
6
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Fourth Amendment permitted the search of a probationer based upon 
reasonable suspicion, and thus evidence garnered pursuant to the 
search was admissible in future criminal trials.36 
The Court reasoned that the search of a probationer is justified 
under the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.37 A 
search is reasonable if the balance between the probationer’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy38 and the government’s interest in 
conducting the search justifies the infringement on a probationer’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.39 A probationer, by virtue of his status, has 
a reduced expectation of privacy.40 Moreover, the Court acknowledged 
that “just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an 
offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose 
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms 
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”41 Consequently, probationers who 
are made unequivocally aware of the search condition and who sign 
the consent form may reasonably be deemed to have notice of their 
lessened privacy rights.42 On the other side of the scale is the 
government’s interest in preventing recidivism and promoting 
rehabilitation, which counters the probationer’s reduced expectation of 
privacy.43 Thus, under the Court’s holding in Knights, the Fourth 
Amendment permits courts to condition probation upon submission to 
searches conducted with reasonable suspicion because such searches 
are reasonable.44  
                                                 
36 Id. at 121.  
37 Id.  
38 It is not just the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy, but also the 
expectation of privacy that society deems acceptable such that it is willing to protect 
that individual’s subjective expectation. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 
(1999). 
39 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984). 
42 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 121. 
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Although the government attempted to justify the search based 
upon the probationer’s consent to the probationary term, the Court 
specifically declined to rule on this argument.45 The government 
argued that the probationer had voluntarily accepted the probationary 
condition and had the option to decline the terms and go to prison 
instead.46 Further, the government argued that such conditions are 
analogous to the “voluntary decision defendants often make to waive 
their right to trial and accept a plea bargain.”47 However, the Court 
declined to determine both whether consent itself justified the search 
and whether searches conducted with less than reasonable suspicion 
would violate the Fourth Amendment because the search in this case 
was conducted with reasonable suspicion and thus permissible.48  
The Griffin and Knights cases demonstrate that probationers are 
entitled to less Fourth Amendment protection than free-citizens, but 
intimate that probationers are not without some degree of protection.49 
In assessing the degree of protection the Fourth Amendment requires, 
both cases employed a balancing test to determine the government’s 
interest in conducting the search and the privacy infringement suffered 
by the probationer.50 However, neither case answered the question of 
whether a probationer’s consent to a probationary condition would 
alone permit the search or whether the Fourth Amendment would 
permit a suspicionless search based upon the probationer’s status. 
These questions were answered in the affirmative by the Seventh 
Circuit.51 
 
                                                 
45 Id. at 120 n. 6. 
46 Id. at 118. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 120 n. 6. 
49 Id.; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. 
50 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. 
51 United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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II. UNITED STATES V. BARNETT:  
JUSTIFYING THE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH OF A PROBATIONER  
 
 On July 18, 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on 
the validity of a search conducted by police officers pursuant to a 
probationer’s consent to the search as part of the terms of his 
probation.52 Judge Posner authored the opinion for a three-judge panel, 
which also consisted of Judge Coffey and Judge Kanne.53 The court 
upheld the suspicionless search, reasoning that the probationary 
waiver should be viewed in light of both consent and plea bargain 
analysis since a probationer may contract away their Fourth 
Amendment rights, thereby justifying a suspicionless search.54  
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
Curtis Barnett (“Barnett”) was found guilty of fleeing from police 
and destroying state property, both of which are felonies under Illinois 
law.55 The trial judge sentenced Barnett to one year of intensive 
probation in lieu of a prison sentence.56 As a condition of probation, as 
set forth in the agreed order, Barnett was required to “submit to 
searches of [his] person, residence, papers, automobile, and/or effects 
at any time such requests are made by the Probation Officer, and 
consent to the use of anything seized as evidence in Court 
proceedings.”57 Barnett’s lawyer acknowledged that Barnett bargained 
                                                 
52 Id. at 691. This case was before the Seventh Circuit on appeal from a 
decision by the S.D. of Illinois District Court to deny the motion to quash evidence 
because the lower court held that Barnett’s consent to suspicionless searches as part 
of his probationary condition provided justification for the search. United States v. 
Barnett, No. 03-CR-30170, 2004 WL 391830, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2004). 
 53 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691. 
54 Id. at 692. 
55 Id. at 691. 
56 Id. The difference between intensive probation as opposed to regular 
probation is the number of conditions that an individual is required to subject 
himself as a prerequisite of being granted the probationary sentence.  
57 Id.  
9
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for these terms so that he could avoid a prison sentence.58 Soon 
thereafter, police conducted a suspicionless search of Barnett’s 
apartment and discovered a firearm in violation of the terms of his 
probation.59  
 
B. Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
 
The Seventh Circuit held that a suspicionless searches of a 
probationer is permissible when the probationer agrees to these 
searches as a term of his probation based upon the intersection of both 
consent and plea bargain law.60 First, the court looked to normal 
consent analysis and acknowledged that an individual may waive their 
constitutional rights if the waiver is both knowing and intelligent.61 
Second, the court compared the probationary condition of a plea 
bargain to a contractual agreement.62 In either case, the court noted 
that Barnett was given the choice of prison or probation and 
voluntarily accepted the consequences of that decision.63  
Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.64 The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that there was nothing unusual about a person 
consenting to a search and relinquishing Fourth Amendment rights 
when they believe they will be better off waiving the right than by 
standing on it.65 Of course, probation, which subjects individuals to 
only occasional suspicionless searches, is less invasive than prison, 
which does not provide even a modicum of Fourth Amendment 
protection.66 Expanding on this line of reasoning, Judge Posner opined 
that a bargained for probation sentence is the equivalent of a plea 
                                                 
58 Id. at 691-92. 
59 Id. at 691. 
60 Id. at 692. 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 691-92.  
64 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
65 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
66 Id. 
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bargain.67 He noted that a plea bargain is a form of contract and is thus 
enforceable and presumed to benefit both parties, though one party 
may give up constitutional rights.68 Accordingly, Barnett gave up very 
little considering the alternative of prison that loomed ahead.69 
Barnett raised two arguments against validating the suspicionless 
search waiver upon the consent approach.70 Barnett argued that the 
blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights invites officers to abuse 
this privilege and conduct arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches.71 
In addition, Barnett argued that the contract was indefinite72 because 
the waiver he signed subjected him to suspicionless searches, but the 
police manual required officers to have reasonable suspicion before 
conducting a search of a probationer’s home.73 This, Barnett argued, 
created a discrepancy in the terms of the agreed order, which 
invalidated the contract.74 The Seventh Circuit rejected both 
arguments.75 
First, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that interpreting the contract as 
an invitation for harassment and improper behavior was inappropriate 
because if two interpretations of a contract are possible, and one 
interpretation would make the contract unenforceable while the other 
term would be enforceable, then the contract is interpreted with the 
                                                 
67 Id. Note that there is a discrepancy as to whether this was an actual plea 
bargain agreement. The district court described the probationary condition waiver a 
bargain between the people and the State because the judge could have sentenced 
him to prison and Barnett was not involuntarily placed on probation since he could 
have refused the condition and went to jail. United States v. Barnett, 03-CR-30170, 
2004 WL 391830, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2004). 
68 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 The bargaining process requires that the parties assent to the terms and that 
the agreement is definite. Definiteness protects the promissee’s expectation interest. 
E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts, 110 (3d ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc.) (1999)  
73 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 693. 
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term that is enforceable.76 Second, it reasoned that the indefinite 
argument must fail because the remedy for an indefinite contract is 
rescission, which places both parties in the position they would have 
been in prior to the contract.77 Under the rescission theory, Barnett’s 
position prior to the probation contract was a prison sentence and 
Barnett did not want to serve a prison sentence and so withdrew this 
argument.78 After dismissing Barnett’s arguments, the Seventh Circuit 
queried no further about whether the imposition of a suspicionless 
search condition should be upheld by the constitutional approach to a 
probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights, unlike the Court’s analysis in 
Griffin and Knights.79  
 
III. JUSTIFYING THE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH UPON CONSENT 
 
The Seventh Circuit erroneously equates the consent given by a 
probationer to the consent given by a free individual. It fails to account 
for a significant difference, namely, that the free individual retains a 
meaningful choice to decline to consent to the search, while the 
probationer is subject to the search regardless of his supposed consent. 
In part, the Barnett court upheld the suspicionless search because it 
reasoned that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement of reasonableness.80 The two cases cited most often in 
support of the Seventh Circuit’s view of consent, Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte81 and Zap v. United States,82 evince an important 
distinction between consent given by a free individual and consent that 
is given in the context of a prerequisite of probation. Failure to 
account for this difference undermines the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 See id.  
80 Id. at 692.  
81 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
82 328 U.S. 624 (1946). 
12
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to uphold the suspicionless search of a probationer based upon a 
consent approach. 
In Schneckloth, the Court delineated the parameters of a Fourth 
Amendment consent case and determined that an individual need not 
be specifically advised of the right to decline an officer’s request to 
search for the individual’s consent to validate the search.83 Although it 
was widely accepted that consent created an exception to the warrant 
requirement, the prosecutor had the burden of proving that the consent 
was freely and voluntarily given.84 The narrow question before the 
Court was whether an individual could freely and voluntarily give 
consent if they were unaware of the ability to decline the officer’s 
request to conduct the search.85 “Voluntariness is a question of fact to 
be determined from all the circumstances;”86 knowledge of a right to 
refuse is only one factor to be taken into account in that 
determination.87  
The Court created a narrow holding when it proclaimed that the 
consent must be both voluntary and given without coercion and only 
applies when the subject of the search is not in-custody.88 For 
example, if police officers were to come to someone’s door and claim 
to have a warrant, then the officer in effect announces “that the 
occupant has no right to consent or to resist the search . . . the situation 
is instinct with coercion . . . where there is coercion there cannot be 
consent.”89 Finally, the Court reasoned that although consent is 
considered a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, waiver is really a 
“standard enunciated. . . in the context of the safeguards of a fair 
                                                 
83 412 U.S. at 249. 
84 Id. at 219. 
85 Id. at 222.  
86 Id. at 226. 
87 Id. at 229. Other factors may include age, education, length of detention, 
prolonged nature of the questioning, and the physical punishment inflicted such as 
the deprivation of food or sleep. 
88 Id. at 249. The Court declined to determine the standard of consent for one 
who was already in custody, but recognized that other courts are particularly 
sensitive to the heightened possibility of coercion in this context. Id. at 240 n. 29. 
89 Id. at 234.  
13
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criminal trial.”90 Thus, there is a difference between waiver and 
consent and the degree of voluntariness needed for each to be 
constitutionally permissible.91 
Proponents of the consent theory also use Zap v. United States to 
support their contention that a suspicionless search may be bargained 
for and thus upheld upon the doctrine of consent.92 In Zap, the 
petitioner had entered into a contract with the Navy Department in 
which he was to conduct experimental work on airplane wings.93 The 
contract provided that all accounts and records of the petitioner would 
be made available to the government at all times.94 The government 
conducted a search pursuant to this term of the contract and discovered 
that the petitioner had committed fraud and overcharged for various 
fees assessed to the Navy.95 The Court upheld the suspicionless search 
conducted pursuant to the terms of the contract reasoning that “to 
obtain the government’s business [the petitioner] specifically agreed to 
permit inspection of his accounts and records,” and thus he voluntarily 
waived his right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.96 
In both Schneckloth and Zap the petitioner was free to walk away 
and refuse to consent to the search.97 It is axiomatic that a voluntary 
choice assumes the ability to decline.98 However, in the case of a 
probationer like Barnett, the probationer is not free to walk away from 
a plea bargain as the petitioners were free to walk away from 
consenting to a search in Schneckloth and Zap.99 The Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
90 Id. at 236. 
91 Id. at 238.  
92 328 U.S. 624 (1946). 
93 Id. at 626. 
94 Id. at 627. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 628. 
97 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220; Zap, 328 U.S. at 327. 
98 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974).  
99 See Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. Had Barnett walked away from the plea 
bargain terms he would have been subject to the same searches while in prison.  See 
generally Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
14
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failed to recognize this important point. Thus, “to speak of consent in 
[the context of a probationary waiver] is to resort to a manifest fiction, 
for the probationer who purportedly waives his rights by accepting a 
condition [he] has little genuine opportunity to refuse.”100 Barnett 
could not voluntarily consent to suspicionless searches because if he 
refused to sign the probationary waiver, he would be placed in prison 
where he would still be subject to suspicionless searches.101 
Accordingly, the consent doctrine should not justify the suspicionless 
search of a probationer.  
Moreover, public policy cautions against using the consent 
approach to justify the infringement of a probationer’s constitutional 
rights because it could result in a slippery slope of unfettered 
prosecutorial discretion. It is easily imagined that the consent theory 
could justify a probationary condition that restricted travel, but could 
this not, taken to its logical, though extreme, conclusion, justify the 
restriction of a probationer’s movement to a 4x4 square, permit the 
restriction of speech during certain hours, or allow the conduction of 
cavity searches without cause without any indication that these 
conditions are in fact necessary for the probationer’s rehabilitation or 
for public safety?  
Perhaps these conditions sound outlandish and that no one would 
consent to such probationary terms. But, are there not thoroughly 
invasive searches conducted in prison, a threat of gang rape, murder, 
and possible solitary confinement such that an individual faced with 
these conditions in prison might voluntarily consent to the 
probationary conditions to be carried out in the privacy of his own 
home?102 And if probation benefits the probationer, and is given in 
return for this consent to these conditions, then under the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning the probationary terms would be permissible.  
                                                 
100 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment 440-41 (4th ed. 2004).  
101 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (holding that prisoners have no 
Fourth Amendment protection and thus may be subject to suspicionless searches). 
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Requiring the court to conduct a formal Fourth Amendment 
analysis and determine the reasonableness of the search condition 
before conditioning probation upon the search requirement, prevents 
prosecutorial abuse that might otherwise be upheld under the consent 
approach. Thus, the court should not be allowed to require the 
prospective probationer to consent to unreasonable probationary 
terms.103 This scenario demonstrates an improper “hooking of the 
crook” by providing no real choice between the constitutional 
infringements outside of the location where the infringement might 
occur, yet justifying the infringement upon meaningful consent. The 
Seventh Circuit’s failure to adequately account for this distinguishing 
fact, inherent in any probationary consent, undermines the analogy 
between a normal consent case and probationary consent. However, 
the Seventh Circuit did not solely rely on the probationary condition as 
a straightforward consent case, but also argued that consent of a 
probationary condition as part of a plea bargain, justified the 
condition.104  
 
IV. THE PROBATIONARY CONDITION AS A PLEA BARGAIN 
 
 The Seventh Circuit improperly implied that a probationer’s 
consent to the terms of his probation is the equivalent of a plea 
bargain.  But even if the probation in Barnett was part of a plea 
bargain agreement, the court should still have been required to 
demonstrate that the condition of suspicionless searches was 
reasonably related and served the purposes of probation. “A plea 
bargain is a negotiated agreement between the defense and the 
prosecution in a criminal case. Typically the defendant agrees to plead 
guilty to a specified charge in exchange for an oral promise of a lower 
                                                 
103 The reasonableness of the search must be determined by conducting a 
formal Fourth Amendment analysis and balancing the interest of the state in 
conducting the search against the interest of the probationer’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. See Part I.   
104 United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (2005). 
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sentence.”105 Plea bargains are deemed to be valid contractual 
agreements that benefit both sides.106 As such, an individual who is 
party to an improper plea agreement is entitled to all of the remedies 
associated with a contract in addition to other protections that ensure 
fairness in criminal proceedings.107 
Individuals often waive their constitutional rights within a plea 
bargain agreement, but the waivers of these rights are generally related 
to the current criminal trial.108 Recall that a plea bargain is an 
agreement between the prosecution and the defendant.109 Thus, the 
prosecution often requests waivers that assist them at trial and makes 
trying the case more cost and time efficient.110 For example, a guilty 
plea sometimes involves relinquishing certain constitutional rights, 
such as the right against self-incrimination, right to a trial by a jury, 
and right to confront accusers.111 But, ordinarily, such plea bargain 
waivers may not require waiver of other rights such as protection of 
double jeopardy, right to challenge the sentence imposed, and right to 
challenge the Defendant’s competency to stand trial.112 Finally, for a 
waiver to be upheld, unlike consent, the prosecution is required to 
inform the individual of his constitutional right and the right to refuse 
                                                 
105 The Lectric Law Library, available at 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p053.htm (last visited on November 29, 2006). 
106 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692; United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 
(11th Cir. 2005); 
107 United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 485, 487-88 (2005). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 486.  
110 See generally Liberetti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (where the 
defendant plead guilty, which he acknowledged waived other constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination and the right to a jury); Rubbo, 396 F.3d at 1332 (where 
the Defendant may agree to cooperate, plead guilty, and waive rights to appeal); 
United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (where the Defendant 
agreed to cooperate and help the prosecution secure the convictions of other 
individuals involved in the drug distribution scheme). 
111 Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Chapter 7, misconduct in 
plea bargaining process.  
112 Id.  
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the plea bargain.113 Thus many waivers declare the individual’s 
constitutional rights and then explicitly inform the individual that by 
signing the waiver he forfeits his rights.114  
Barnett’s probationary condition that waived all of his Fourth 
Amendment protection raises three questions. First, was Barnett’s 
probationary waiver in fact a plea bargain or was it a normal 
probationary condition that was dubbed a plea bargain? Second, did 
the plea bargain terms conform to the purposes and spirit of probation 
and should that matter? And third, given that a plea bargain normally 
assists the prosecution at the current trial, should a plea bargain that 
waives constitutional rights, require infringement of those rights in 
subsequent trials? 
 The language used by the Barnett court in the United States 
District Court opinion creates an inference that Barnett’s probation 
was not in fact part of the terms of a plea bargain, but rather normal 
conditions consented to by a prospective probationer. This inference is 
supported by the fact that the district court found that the consent 
doctrine should apply and not the doctrine of plea bargaining.115 
Although it is true that Barnett’s lawyer conceded that Barnett had 
signed and consented to the conditions of intensive probation 
supervision and that this consent constituted a bargain between 
Barnett and the People of the State of Illinois,116 the government 
defended the search on the basis of consent and not on the basis of 
enforcing the terms of the plea bargain.117 Further, the court described 
this bargain not as an agreement in which Barnett consented to waive 
his rights at trial for a reduced sentence, but as a normal consent to 
probation where the “condition was one among many accepted in the 
place of going to prison.”118 The term bargain was used because the 
court stated, “what is not present in this case is a defendant who was 
                                                 
113 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
114 See id. at 236. 
115 United States v. Barnett, 03-CR-30170, 2004 WL 391830, at *1, (S.D. Ill. 
Feb 27, 2004). 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at *2. 
118 Id. at *3. 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 221
involuntarily placed on probation . . . and who has no right to refuse 
the conditions.”119 This language creates an inference that the bargain 
was merely to stay out of prison and not a term of in a comprehensive 
plea bargain agreement.   
Normally, a prosecutor enters into a plea bargain agreement 
before the suspect is convicted and the suspect pleads guilty as part of 
the plea bargain in return for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a 
reduced sentence.120 Though one may easily recognize that the 
prosecutor may well wield more bargaining power, at least there is the 
notion that the prosecutor will not be overly greedy in their offered 
terms of the plea bargain because to do so would jeopardize their 
ability to make a deal that is both cost and time efficient.121 This is not 
the case if the defendant is already found guilty and the risks of trial 
have passed.122 Post conviction, the prosecutor has all of the cards and 
can condition a reduced sentence on any condition he so desires.123 In 
this instance the plea bargain analysis should not apply.  
But, even if Barnett’s condition was in fact part of a broader plea 
bargaining scheme, should not the probationary condition comport 
with the policy and purpose behind probation? Probation is an 
alternative to incarceration and may serve as in independent sentence 
if it is fashioned to fully meet the statutory purposes of sentencing, 
“including respect for the law, providing just punishment for the 
offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the public from 
further crimes by the defendant.”124 Further, the court may impose 
conditions of probation only to the extent that those conditions are 
both reasonably related to the offense or history of the defendant and 
                                                 
119 Id.  
120 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YLJ 
1909 (1992). 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1918; see also Part III supra.  
124 Sentencing Guidelines, § 5B1.1, November 1, 2006. 
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the conditions involve only those deprivations of liberty or property as 
are reasonably necessary for the purpose of sentencing.125 
The language used by the sentencing guidelines regarding 
probation is remarkably close to the analysis conducted in a typical 
constitutional approach, namely, a determination of whether the search 
is reasonable based upon the government’s interests in ensuring the 
rehabilitation of the probationer and preventing recidivism is balanced 
against the privacy expectations of the probationer.126 Although it is 
clear that a probationary condition that requires submission to searches 
predicated upon reasonable suspicion are appropriate both because it 
serves the policy and purpose of the probationary statute and is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there is no indication that a 
suspicionless search standard is equally appropriate because the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion failed to conduct a Fourth Amendment 
analysis and neglected to point to any proof in the record that such a 
condition was reasonably necessary and conformed to the policies of 
the probationary sentence.127  
In this case, Barnett was charged with destroying state property 
and running from police.128 Assuming we are concerned that this 
individual has a higher penchant than the normal citizen to commit 
this type of crime based on past performance, is a subsequent 
suspicionless search of Barnett’s house or his person likely to stop a 
recurrence of this type of crime? Arguably it does not. Nor is it likely 
that the police will catch Barnett for recommitting property damage by 
subjecting him to suspicionless searches. Thus, the government should 
not justify search conditions unrelated to the probationary policy 
simply because it attaches such a condition to a plea bargain scheme.  
Finally, the waiver required Barnett to both submit to 
suspicionless searches and to permit the use of any evidence 
discovered during the search in both a probation revocation hearing 
                                                 
125 Id. at § 5B1.3; 18 U.S.C. § 3553 
126 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
127 See United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (2005). 
128 Id.  
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and a subsequent criminal trial.129 This issue was not raised by 
Barnett’s counsel or by the court; however, this condition should be 
deemed impermissible because the United States Supreme Court has 
justified removing normal Fourth Amendment protection simply 
because of the unique situation of a probationer and the atmosphere of 
a probation revocation hearing.130 Normal exclusionary rules and 
careful assessment of Fourth Amendment propriety do not apply in a 
probation revocation hearing because it is not deemed an adversarial 
process.131 Although the Court in United States v. Knights permitted 
evidence discovered in a search into a subsequent trial, this was only 
after determining the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
thus the exclusionary rule would not apply.132 Here, not only during an 
adversarial process did the Seventh Circuit justify the removal of all 
Fourth Amendment protection, but also condoned the expansion of the 
primary place in which these protections are most sacrosanct by 
allowing evidence to be submitted at a subsequent criminal trial.133 
 Justifying the complete removal of Fourth Amendment protection 
as part of a plea bargaining process, a process where constitutional 
rights are dependent upon a kind of contract in which one side has all 
of the bargaining power,134 should be narrowly construed and required 
to comport with the constitutional guidelines of those rights that the 
bargain purports to limit. Although constitutional rights may be 
waived within the plea bargain process, these concessions are not 
beyond judicial review and may be overturned if the agreement 
constitutes an unconstitutional condition.135 The Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to justify a search of a probationer or parolee 
                                                 
129 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691. 
130 Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 534 U.S. 357, 364 (1998). 
131 Id. at 365. 
132 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001). 
133 See more about this in Scott, 524 U.S. 357. 
134 People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143 (1964).  
135 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984). 
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upon the consent/contract approach136 and it is arguably because such 
a condition would in fact create an unconstitutional condition. 
 
V. DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER CONSTITUTE AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION? 
 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may invalidate a plea 
bargain that conditions probation upon a suspicionless search. The 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions precludes the government from 
conditioning discretionary privileges upon an individual’s waiver of a 
constitutional right in certain circumstances.137 Thus, even if the 
probationer consents to a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment 
rights as a condition of bargained-for-probation, the search condition 
may be nonetheless unlawful under this doctrine.138  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota v. Murphy supports 
the contention that the government may not condition probation upon 
an individual’s waiver of constitutional rights in all circumstances.139 
In Murphy, the defendant was twice questioned about the murder and 
rape of a teenage girl, but he was never charged with the crime.140 On 
an unrelated incident, Murphy pled guilty to a reduced charge of false 
imprisonment for which he was sentenced to a suspended prison term 
of sixteen months and three years of probation.141 The probationary 
terms required Murphy to “participate in a treatment program for 
sexual offenders . . . report to his probation officer as directed, and be 
truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters.’”142 During the 
course of treatment, Murphy admitted to his counselor that he had 
                                                 
136 Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 n.3 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).  
137 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).  
138 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984). 
139 Id. at 437. 
140 Id. at 422. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
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committed a rape and murder.143 The counselor relayed this 
information to Murphy’s probation officer, who then set up a meeting 
during which the probation officer intended to ask Murphy questions 
regarding the rape and murder.144 Murphy was compelled to truthfully 
answer the probation officer’s questions as a condition of his 
probation.145 He asserted that the probationary condition that required 
him to answer questions truthfully was in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights.146 
The Court did not agree with Murphy’s assessment of the 
probationary condition.147 The Court reasoned that a penalty case is a 
situation where the state not only compels an individual to testify, but 
also induces their waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by “threatening to 
impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-
incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’”148 Thus, a state may 
not “expressly or by implication, assert[] that invocation of the 
privilege would lead to revocation of probation.”149 The Court 
reasoned that Murphy’s probationary conditions prohibited only false 
statements, but did not restrict his freedom to answer particular 
questions and it did not require that he waive his future Fifth 
Amendment rights.150 
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,151 
the Court limited the government’s ability to condition the receipt of a 
benefit upon the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. In Von Raab, the 
government restricted certain jobs with the U.S. customs service 
department to those individuals who consented to submit to 
                                                 
143 Id. at 423.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 424.  
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 427. 
148 Id. at 434. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 436. 
151 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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suspicionless drug-testing.152 Specifically, individuals who handled 
guns, drugs, or “classified material” were required to submit to such 
searches as a condition of employment.153 The Court did not examine 
whether employees legally consented to such searches by signing valid 
waivers nor did it reason that submission to such searches was 
bargained for because the employee had access to better job 
positions.154 The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
government could condition the benefit of employment upon a 
prospective employee’s waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights.155 
The Court dealt with this question by employing the constitutional 
approach.156  
Under the constitutional approach, the Court determines the 
reasonableness of the search condition by balancing the individual’s 
expectation of privacy against the government’s interest in conducting 
the search without individualized suspicion.157 The Court 
acknowledged that the government had a substantial interest to ensure 
that employees who handled guns and drugs were not under the 
influence and were trustworthy and dependable.158 Although 
individuals have a high expectation of privacy as relates to body fluid 
taken for drug testing, the Court held that the government interest 
outweighed the individual’s privacy expectation.159 Thus, the 
government may condition employment on an employee’s submission 
to drug testing where such employee may handle drugs or guns.160 
However, the Court declined to uphold the government’s drug testing 
                                                 
152 Id. at 661. Urine testing is a search, and thus must be examined under the 
Fourth Amendment test for to determine its reasonableness. 
153 Id. at 664. 
154 Id. at 660. Employees do not sign waivers, but were sent a later stating that 
if they wished to pursue the job they must submit to these searches and that a drug 
screening center would contact them to make arrangements. 
155 Id. at 665. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 665-66. 
158 Id. at 670. 
159 Id. at 672. 
160 Id. at 679. 
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of employees who handle classified material because the government 
failed to demonstrate a serious need to justify the invasion of Fourth 
Amendment protection.161 
In both Murphy and Von Raab, the Court determined the validity 
of certain conditions that the government placed upon a benefit. 
Although in each instance it was possible to assess the validity of the 
required condition by employing the consent approach and examining 
the contractual agreement between the parties, instead, the Court 
examined the condition using a constitutional approach.162 Thus the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies in situations where the 
government “seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining 
bargained-for consent.”163 And the government may only condition a 
grant or deny a benefit where the condition is constitutionally 
permissible, which requires the court to analyze the conditionality of 
the condition.164  
A search condition may be constitutionally permissible if it is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.165 “Where a condition of 
probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the 
condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent that it is overbroad it 
is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation 
and rehabilitation and is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise 
of the probationer’s privacy.”166  
The Seventh Circuit failed to discuss the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in Barnett, likely because it had already dismissed 
this notion and the language of Minnesota v. Murphy in an earlier 
                                                 
161 Id. at 678. 
162 See, e.g., id. at 665-66. Similarly, this is the same approach the Court 
employed in United States v. Knights where the Court was required to determine the 
validity of the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as a prerequisite of probation. 
534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
163 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). 
164 Id. 
165 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
166 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, 5 SearchSzr § 10.10 (2007). 
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Judge Posner opinion, United States v. Cranley.167 In Cranley, the 
court allowed Wisconsin to condition probation upon a probationer’s 
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights as a prerequisite to probation 
because it reasoned that “Wisconsin need not provide probation as a 
possible sentencing option.”168 The court then dismissed the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine because while it agreed that 
Wisconsin could not condition probation upon being a non-Jew or 
being white, it could condition probation upon the requirement that the 
convict provide a “full accounting of any criminal behavior in which 
[the convict] engaged.”169 The court acknowledged that this condition 
would conflict with the language of the Murphy Court, but reasoned 
that in light of cases like Griffin v. Wisconsin and United States v. 
Knights, the trend had been to enforce terms associated with a 
conditional release.170 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to 
acknowledge that the probationary terms in those cases were only 
enforced because the Court deemed them reasonable in light of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.171 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit should have 
conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis to decide whether the 
suspicionless search of a probationer is reasonable before permitting 
the government to condition probation upon the search. The Seventh 
Circuit’s shortcut of upholding this search condition upon the 
consent/contract approach is thus fatally flawed unless such conditions 
are permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: SAMSON V. CALIFORNIA 
 
When the Seventh Circuit decided Barnett, probationers were 
protected under the Fourth Amendment by the reasonable suspicion 
standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
                                                 
167 350 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2003). 
168 Id. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 621.  
171 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001); Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1984). 
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Knights.172 Subsequently, in the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court 
permitted a suspicionless search of a parolee after determining that the 
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in Samson v. 
California.173 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to uphold the suspicionless search of a probationer 
under the consent/contract approach was a harmless error in light of 
the more recent Supreme Court case. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to 
uphold the probationary condition upon consent may be permissible if 
that condition is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and thus an 
appropriate condition of a probationary plea bargain agreement.174  
The petitioner in Samson was a parolee who while walking down 
the street was approached by a police officer, who knew of Samson’s 
parole status and believed that there was a warrant out for Samson’s 
arrest.175 Although the police officer soon learned that there was not an 
outstanding warrant against Samson, the officer conducted a search of 
Samson’s person based solely on Samson’s status as a parolee.176 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether a suspicionless search of 
a parolee violated the Fourth Amendment.177  
The Samson Court conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis of the 
search and determined that a suspicionless search of a parolee is 
reasonable.178 An individual’s status determines their reasonable 
expectation of privacy.179 The Court used the term “continuum” to 
explain the relationship between an individual’s status and their 
reasonable expectation of privacy.180 At the highest end of the 
continuum is a free citizen who is afforded the full protection of the 
                                                 
172 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001). 
173 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006). 
174 See generally Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984). 
175 126 S.Ct. at 2196. 
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 2196-97. 
179 Id. at 2197. 
180 Id. at 2198. 
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Fourth Amendment.181 At the lowest end of the continuum is a 
prisoner who has no expectation of privacy, and thus does not have 
any protection under the Fourth Amendment.182 The Court determined 
that a parolee has a lower expectation of privacy than a probationer 
because parole is in addition to a prison sentence and not in lieu of 
prison.183 Thus, parolees are the second lowest on the continuum just 
above a prisoner.184 
Next, the Court examined the government’s interest in supervising 
parolees: preventing recidivism and promoting parolee 
rehabilitation.185 The government’s interest in supervising parolees is 
“overwhelming” because “parolees are more likely to commit future 
criminal offenses.”186 The Court examined the empirical evidence put 
forth by the Criminal Justice center in California, which demonstrated 
that the recidivism rate of parolees was astronomical.187 The Court 
then determined that California’s ability to conduct a suspicionless 
search of a parolee serves its interest in reducing recidivism in a 
manner that aids rehabilitation and reintegration into society.188 
Moreover, the government’s interest in conducting suspicionless 
searches is significantly high because parolees are released into 
society regardless of whether the parolee is able to reintegrate.189 
Thus, requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion before they 
conduct a search of a parolee would hinder law enforcement interest in 
both promoting rehabilitation and preventing recidivism when these 
                                                 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 2198 n.2 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984)).  
183 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2198 (this is important because a prisoner has no 
expectation of privacy and thus a parolee would have been accustomed to police 
searches); see Hudson, 468 U.S. 517. 
184 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2198. 
185 Id. at 2200. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. (noting that 70% of the paroled felons re-offend within 18 months). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. Prisoners are released after they complete the days of their sentence 
which is then reduced by good time credits earned and without regard to whether 
that individual is indeed ready for parole. 
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individuals have not demonstrated a capacity to avoid criminal 
conduct.190 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee 
because the balance between the privacy interest of the parolee and the 
government’s interests make this search reasonable.191  
Although parolees are subject to suspicionless searches, a similar 
search standard for a probationer may violate the Fourth Amendment 
for two reasons. First, probationers have a greater expectation of 
privacy than prisoners and parolees, and therefore should not be 
similarly subject to suspicionless searches.192 Second, a suspicionless 
search standard would hinder law enforcement efforts.193 Thus both 
sides of the balancing test are impacted and demonstrate that the 
suspicionless search of a probationer is not justified under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
The probationer should maintain a degree of Fourth Amendment 
protection.194 Parolees have a lesser expectation of privacy than 
probationers because parole is more akin to imprisonment than 
probation is to imprisonment.195 The probationer is above the parolee 
on the continuum and below free citizens on the continuum.196 
Accordingly, probationers should be afforded a higher degree of 
Fourth Amendment protection than parolees, but less protection than 
free citizens.197 The reasonable suspicion standard provides the 
appropriate degree of protection.198  
Not only does the probationer’s expectation of privacy weigh 
against a suspicionless search, but the government’s interest in 
conducting the search is less imperative in the case of a probationer 
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than in the case of a parolee. The parole system at issue in Samson 
granted prisoners parole irrespective of whether the inmate was 
deemed capable of reintegrating into society.199 It follows that the 
government would be significantly concerned about preventing 
anticipated future crime of those individuals who have not fully 
reformed.200 In contrast, probation is only granted when the sentencing 
judge believes that the sentence will be conducive to the convict’s 
rehabilitation and the convict does not pose a serious risk of 
recidivism that would caution against probation.201 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit should have held that police officers must have a reasonable 
suspicion before searching a probationer’s apartment.  
 
VII. RESCISSION OR REFORMATION  
 
The proper remedy of an improperly imposed criminal sentence 
should be either reformation or a new trial.202 Yet, the Seventh Circuit 
opined that if the plea bargain’s suspicionless search condition was 
improper then the proper remedy was rescission, which would indicate 
that Barnett would be sentenced to jail.203 The court indicted this was 
the proper remedy because it operated under the mistaken assumption 
that the only feasible defense against enforcing the terms of Barnett’s 
plea bargain was the claim that its terms were indefinite.204 However, 
in light of the foregoing analysis, if the probationary terms were 
invalid, not only because they were indefinite but also 
unconstitutional, then the proper remedy should be reformation of the 
sentence or a new trial. 
Barnett defended the terms of his probationary conditions, 
which independently purported to justify a warrantless and 
unreasonable search of his person and property, on the basis that the 
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plea agreement and the probation office policy guidelines could render 
the agreement void for indefiniteness because, he alleged, that the 
terms of the plea agreement and the probation office policy guidelines, 
which required officers to have reasonable suspicion before 
conducting the search, were in contradiction.205 Judge Posner, 
however, upheld the search condition reasoning that the condition was 
part of a plea bargain in which Barnett received a benefit of not going 
to jail and the state received the benefit of being able to keep a close 
watch over his activities and use any discovered evidence against 
Barnett in a subsequent trial.206 But, if the contract was unenforceable 
because it was indefinite then the parties would be returned to the 
positions they would have occupied had there been no contract.207 
The doctrine of indefiniteness applies when the terms of a 
contract are not reasonably certain to create a basis for determining the 
existence of a breach or selecting an appropriate remedy.208 In such 
cases, the proper remedy is rescission.209 However, in addition to the 
indefiniteness argument, this condition may be challenged on the basis 
that the parties entered into the agreement on the mistaken belief that 
such a condition was constitutionally permissible. The proper review 
of a criminal sentence is to determine whether it is unreasonable.210 
Where a sentence is deemed improper and unreasonable then the 
proper remedy is to reform the verdict or the defendant may be entitled 
to a new trial.211 Moreover, neither party has a constitutional right to 
explicitly enforce the terms of a plea bargain agreement.212 Thus the 
recommended and negotiated sentence does not bind the court.213  
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The sentencing court determined that Barnett demonstrated the 
ability to be placed on probation, and although the court permitted the 
probation with the condition of intensified monitoring, it is entirely 
possible and appropriate that Barnett should be re-sentenced and 
subject to monitoring by police under terms and conditions that are 
constitutionally permissible. Thus, reforming Barnett’s probationary 
sentence to subject him to searches conducted with reasonable 




The Seventh Circuit’s consent/contract approach to justifying the 
suspicionless search of a probationer improperly hooked the crook in 
United States v. Barnett when the court upheld the constitutionally 
questionable probationary condition of a suspicionless search upon the 
basis that a convict voluntarily consents to the condition to avoid a 
prison sentence. The court’s three page decision created a loophole 
around constitutional analysis and is problematic both because it paves 
the way for prosecutorial misconduct and creates an unconstitutional 
condition, summarily dismissing the implication this decision will 
have on a probationer’s constitutional rights.     
As a consequence of the Barnett decision, the law regarding 
proper analysis of probationary conditions became unclear in the 
Seventh Circuit. Thus, without further direction from the Supreme 
Court, that the suspicionless search of a probationer is permissible 
within the bounds of Fourth Amendment protection, courts throughout 
the country will inevitably muddle the analysis of questionable 
probationary conditions instead of applying a straight forward 
constitutional approach and assessing the impact of the probationary 
condition on a probationer’s constitutional rights. 
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